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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan,*
Michelle L. McClafferty,**
Tala Amirfazli,***
and Adelyn B. Boleman****
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2018 - 2019 survey period yielded noteworthy decisions relating
to federal trial practice and procedure in the Eleventh Circuit, several
of which involved issues of first impression. This article analyzes recent
developments in the Eleventh Circuit, including significant rulings in
the areas of civil procedure, statutory interpretation, class actions,
arbitration and subject matter jurisdiction.
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Whether a District Court Has Jurisdiction to Hear A Rule 54(b)
Motion to Enter Final Judgment on Claims That Were Resolved
Prior to the Plaintiff Filing a Rule 41(a) Voluntary Dismissal of
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Remaining Claims.
In Perry v. Schumacher Group of Louisiana,1 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed an issue of first impression of whether a district court has
jurisdiction to hear a plaintiff's Rule 54(b) motion to enter final
judgment on her previously-resolved claims when the parties purported
to dismiss the remaining claim by filing a Rule 41(a) stipulation. 2
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that because such a Rule
41(a) stipulation is invalid, a district court does have jurisdiction to
consider a Rule 54(b) motion regarding previously-resolved claims.3
The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, was against five defendants and alleged multiple claims arising
out of alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
42 U.S.C. § 1981.4 Once the district court disposed of all but one of
Plaintiff's claims,5 the parties entered into a "Joint Stipulation for
Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice of Count III (42 U.S.C. § 1981)
of Fourth Amended Complaint" (the "Stipulation") pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1)(A) with the intention of Plaintiff thereafter appealing the
disposition of the Resolved Claims. 6 Based on the Stipulation, the
District Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants on the Resolved
Claims with prejudice, stating that there was "nothing further
remain[ing] to be done."7
Thereafter, Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her Resolved Claims. 8
However, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately dismissed the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction due to the fact that the District Court's order was "nonfinal" since it dismissed her § 1981 claim without prejudice.9 In light of
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1. 891 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2018).
2. Id. at 957.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 956. Following the original complaint, plaintiff amended her complaint four
times. Id. The final Fourth Amended Complaint contained eight claims, each against a
specific defendant or defendants. Id. Because the plaintiff sued one of the defendants in
error, she voluntarily dismissed her claim against the fifth defendant, leaving four
defendants in this action. Id.
5. Id. The district court disposed of seven of the eight counts, resolving the claims
against three of the four defendants (the "Resolved Claims"). Id. Thus, the plaintiff's only
remaining claim was her discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Naples
HMA, LLC ("NHMA"). Id.
6. Id. at 957. Because the plaintiff did not want to proceed to trial only on her one
remaining claim, she and NHMA entered into the Stipulation, which stated that "[t]he
parties agree that Count III of the Fourth Amended Complaint as the remaining claim in
this action is hereby dismissed without prejudice." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also Perry v. Schumacher Grp., No. 14-15600 (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2005).
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the Eleventh Court's dismissal of her first appeal, Plaintiff moved the
District Court to enter final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) as to the
Resolved Claims and to dismiss her § 1981 claim with prejudice. 10
However, the District Court denied Plaintiff's motions, stating that it
lacked jurisdiction to grant the plaintiff's Rule 54(b) motion. 11 Plaintiff
appealed this decision.12
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court, finding
that the Stipulation did not divest the district court of its jurisdiction
because the Stipulation, which attempted only to dismiss one claim as
opposed to the entire action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A), was invalid. 13
The Eleventh Circuit focused on the "plain text" of Rule 41(a)(1)(A) and
explained that Rule 41(a)(1)(A) governs the dismissal of entire actions
rather than a particular claim.14 The Court also noted that because the
Federal Rules provide multiple ways for a plaintiff to dismiss a single
claim without dismissing an entire action, 15 the existence of these
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10. Perry, 891 F.3d at 956.
11. Id. The district court stated that it "lack[ed] jurisdiction over the substance of the
case" in light of Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of her § 1981 claim. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 957–58.
14. Id. Rule 41(a)(1)(A) states in pertinent part as follows:
(A) Without a Court Order. . . . the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order
by filing: (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a
motion for summary judgment; or (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared.
Id. at 958 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added)). The Eleventh Circuit
stressed that "[t]here is no mention in the Rule of the option to stipulate dismissal of a
portion of a plaintiff's lawsuit—e.g., a particular claim—while leaving a different part of
the lawsuit pending before the trial court." Id. (citing Berthold Types Ltd. v. Adobe Sys.
Inc., 242 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 2001); 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2362 (3d ed. 2008)).
15. Id. First, Rule 15 allows a plaintiff to seek leave to amend the complaint to
eliminate any remaining claim and requires the district court to "freely give leave when
justice so requires." Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15). The Eleventh Circuit noted that it
"cannot foresee how leave to amend could be denied [by the district court] given the
circumstances" that the plaintiff "conceded that she was willing to drop her § 1981 claim
against NHMA" and "wished to seek immediate appellate review of the District Court's
disposition of [the Resolved Claims]." Id. Had Plaintiff filed an amended complaint
pursuant to Rule 15 to drop her § 1981 claim, "the District Court would have entered final
judgment against her and she could have appealed everything at once." Id. The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that "Rule 15 was designed for situations like this." Id. Next, the
plaintiff could have invoked Rule 54(b) before entering into the Stipulation if she wished
to preserve her § 1981 claim against NHMA. Id. The Court noted that "Rule 54(b) allows a
plaintiff to seek and obtain final judgment on claims already defeated in an action with
other claims still pending, as long as 'there is no just reason for delay.'" Id. (citing FED. R.
CIV. P. 54(b)).
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methods confirms that the purpose of Rule 41(a) is to dismiss entire
actions rather than particular claims.16 Therefore, because the
Stipulation was invalid, it did not divest the district court of its
jurisdiction.17
B. Dismissal With Prejudice of Complaint on Shotgun Pleading
Grounds.
In Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets,18 the Eleventh Circuit balanced
various precedents relating to a district court's obligations prior to
dismissing a complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 8 on shotgun
pleading grounds, holding that "[w]hen a litigant files a shotgun
pleading, is represented by counsel, and fails to request leave to amend,
a district court must sua sponte give him one chance to replead before
dismissing his case with prejudice on non-merits shotgun pleading
grounds."19
The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida.20 The plaintiff, represented by counsel,
filed his six count, 49-page original complaint against the defendants21
and shortly thereafter amended the complaint as a matter of right and
filed a six count, 56-page amended complaint.22 The district court
concluded that the first amended complaint was "a mostly incoherent
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16. Id.
17. Id. The Court noted that if the plaintiff had succeeded in her attempted to
dismiss the § 1981 claim, she may have fallen into the "finality trap" which occurs when a
district court disposes of some, but not all, claims on the merits, and the plaintiff then
voluntarily dismisses the action without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a). Id. at 959, n. 3.
In general, when the dreaded "finality trap" occurs, a district court may lose its
jurisdiction to rule on a subsequent motion to enter final judgment for the previously
disposed claims and thus, appellate review may be permanently foreclosed because the
dismissal of the action without prejudice is not a "final decision" and not appealable under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. (citing Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298, 302 (5th
Cir. 1978)). Although the Eleventh Circuit has not ruled on whether the "finality rule"
applies in the circumstances presented by this case, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
because the Stipulation was invalid "the case never left the District Court's bosom" and
the Court "[has] no occasion to reach that issue here." Id.
18. 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018).
19. Id. at 1296.
20. Id. at 1293.
21. The original complaint also contained 109 pages of exhibits. Id.
22. Id. The first amended complaint also contained 168 pages of exhibits. Id. The
Eleventh Circuit noted that its detail in the length of the plaintiff's complaints "should
not be construed as an indictment against all long complaints," but rather the detail
"serves as one illustration of the shotgun nature of the pleadings in this case." Id. at 1293
n. 2.
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document containing duplicative, inconsistent, and wholly conclusory
allegations," which were "oftentimes not connected to a particular
Defendant or set of Defendants, making it impossible to understand
who did what," the district court dismissed the first amended complaint
without prejudice for violating Rule 8 after several defendants filed
motions to dismiss.23 In its 15-page order, the district court enumerated
the numerous deficiencies in the first amended complaint, providing a
detailed roadmap for the plaintiff to cure such deficiencies should he
wish to proceed with his case and sua sponte provided the plaintiff an
opportunity to file a second amended complaint within ten days. 24 After
the plaintiff filed a 70-page25 second amended complaint with similar
deficiencies, the district court dismissed the second amended complaint
with prejudice under Rule 8.26 Although the plaintiff did not file any
motions with the district court or requests for leave to amend, he
appealed the order dismissing his second amended complaint. 27
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that a district court is only permitted
to dismiss a pleading with prejudice on Rule 8 shotgun pleading
grounds when it finds evidence of bad faith. 28 The Eleventh Circuit,
balancing well-established precedent, held that when a plaintiff,
represented by counsel, files a shotgun pleading and fails to request
leave to amend, "a district court must sua sponte give him one chance to
replead before dismissing his case with prejudice on non-merits shotgun
pleadings grounds."29 The Eleventh Circuit also held that a district
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23. Id. at 1293 (omitting internal quotations). Despite the motions to dismiss, the
plaintiff never requested leave to amend the first amended complaint. Id.
24. Id.
25. The second amended complaint also contained 160 pages of exhibits. Id.
26. Id. The district court found that the second amended complaint "remain[ed]
duplicative" and "continue[d] to contain labeling and numerical inconsistencies" and
"continue[d] to fail to provide even minimal notice to the individual Defendants as to what
conduct they are alleged to have participated in." Id. (alterations in original) (citing Vibe
Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, No. 15-cv-80999, 2016 WL 4256915, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. July 19,
2016)). After the plaintiff filed the second amended complaint, the defendants again filed
motions to dismiss and the plaintiff, still represented by counsel, again failed to request
leave to amend his complaint. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that his request for
"'further relief . . . that the [District] Court deems fair, just and equitable' in his response
to a motion to dismiss was tantamount to a request for leave to amend." Id. at 1294 n.3.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1294. On appeal, the plaintiff admitted that his second amended complaint
"had not fixed all of the shot-gun pleading problems that resulted in the dismissal of the
[first amended complaint]," but argued that the district court should have provided him
with "at least one additional opportunity to fix the pleading problems." Id.
29. Id. at 1296. The standard of review for a dismissal on Rule 8 shotgun pleadings
grounds is abuse of discretion. Id. at 1294. Rule 8 requires "a short and plain statement of
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court must, as the district court did in this case, "explain how the
offending pleading violates the shotgun pleading rules so that the party
may properly avoid future shotgun pleadings." 30 Because the district
court sua sponte gave the plaintiff a chance to replead and provided him
with a "veritable instruction manual" on how to cure the shotgun
deficiencies, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the second amended complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 8 when
Plaintiff failed to fix the pleading problems. 31
C. Whether an Appeal is Barred by Res Judicata Because of Another
Court's Treatment of the Judgment as Having a Preclusive Effect.
In Stardust, 3007 LLC v. City of Brookhaven,32 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed an issue of first impression whether the doctrine of res

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 95 Side B
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the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and, generally, a shotgun pleading
fails "to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds
upon which each claim rests" and "waste[s] scarce judicial resources, inexorably
broaden[s] the scope of discovery, wreak[s] havoc on appellate court dockets, and
undermine[s] the public's respect for the courts." Id. at 1294–95 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8;
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015); David
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 979–83 (11th Cir. 2008), abrogated on
other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d
929 (2007)). However, as the district court did in this case, the district court must sua
sponte allow a plaintiff once chance to remedy the shotgun pleading deficiencies. Id. at
1295 (citing Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2006)).
But, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "a district court is not required to grant a plaintiff
leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by
counsel, never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district
court." Id. (citing Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir.
2002) (en banc). In reviewing the cases together, the Eleventh Circuit's holding balances
the district court's obligation to allow the plaintiff one chance to amend his shotgun
pleading sua sponte with the district court's ability to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice if the plaintiff has still neither filed a compliant pleading nor asked for leave to
amend. Id. at 1296.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Eleventh Circuit expressly stated that it "will not adopt a rule requiring
district courts to endure endless shotgun pleadings." Id. at 1297. Because the second
amended complaint contained certain state law claims that were not analyzed on the
merits, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for the limited purpose of the district
court to clarify that it dismissed the state law claims without prejudice to allow the
plaintiff an opportunity to refile in state court. Id. at 1296–97. The Eleventh Circuit noted
that although it is possible for the district court to continue to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over pendant state-law claims, if the district court chooses to dismiss the state
law claims with the federal claims, it should do so without prejudice to allow the plaintiff
to refile his state law claims in state court. Id. at 1296 (citing Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank
of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 1997); Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352
(11th Cir. 1999)).
32. 899 F.3d 1164 (11th Cir. 2018).
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judicata barred an appeal from a district court judgment that another
court had treated as having a preclusive effect. 33 Ultimately, the court
joined several sister circuits in its decision that res judicata does not
bar direct review of a district court judgment, even when the judgment
has been accorded preclusive effect by other courts. 34
The plaintiff sued the City of Brookhaven (the "City") in the Superior
Court of DeKalb County, Georgia ("Superior Court") to enjoin
enforcement of the City's Sexually Oriented Business Code (the "Code")
on the basis that it violated provisions of both the United States and
Georgia Constitutions (the "State Court Action"). 35 Several months after
filing the State Court Action, the plaintiff sued the City in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 36 After the City
counterclaimed, seeking injunctive relief that would require the
plaintiff to cease operating a sexual device shop, the plaintiff filed an
amended complaint.37 The district court granted the City's motion for
summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. 38
While the appeal was pending, the Superior Court entered a
permanent injunction against the plaintiff in the State Court Action.39
The Superior Court held that the plaintiff's federal constitutional
claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata based on the district
court's prior order granting summary judgment to the City. 40 As for the
plaintiff's claims based on violations of the Georgia Constitution, the
Superior Court issued alternative rulings. 41 The Superior Court first
held that because the Georgia and United States constitutional
provisions at issue were identical and because the federal court found
no violation of the United States Constitution, the Superior Court was
bound to rule in favor of the City based on the principles of res judicata.
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 96 Side A
05/29/2020 07:30:56

33. Id.
34. Id. at 1171.
35. Id. at 1168, 1169. Prior to the State Court Action, the City brought a 255-count
criminal accusation against the plaintiff in Brookhaven Municipal Court for alleged
violations of the Code. Id. at 1169. In response, the plaintiff raised constitutional defenses
to the various charges and thereafter filed the State Court Action. Id.
36. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the City's denial of its sign permit application
violated its rights under both the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The injunction ordered the plaintiff to cease operating a sexual device shop in
violation of the City's Code. Id.
40. Id. at 1170.
41. Id.
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The Superior Court alternatively held that the plaintiff's claims failed
on the merits.42 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.43
On appeal in federal court, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue
of first impression regarding whether an appeal is precluded on the
basis that a superior court decided it was bound to give a district court
judgment preclusive effect.44 The Court explained that because the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's order without
providing an opinion, there was a possibility that the Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed the order on the ground that it was bound by the district
court's decision rather than based on the merits. 45 For this reason, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was not bound by the Supreme
Court's decision.46
The Eleventh Circuit explained, applying res judicata principles, "a
judgment merely voidable because based upon an erroneous view of the
law . . . can be corrected only by a direct review" and a direct review is
exactly what the plaintiff sought.47 Looking to sister circuits, the
Eleventh Circuit explained that it would make no sense for an appeal
from a district court order or judgment to be precluded based on
another court's treatment of the district court judgment or order as
having a preclusive effect.48 For this reason, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that res judicata did not preclude the plaintiff from litigating
its claims in the appeal.49
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42. Id.
43. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed without providing an opinion. Id.
44. Id. at 1171. The Court analyzed the nature of the Superior Court's order, as well
as the Georgia Supreme Court's summary affirmance. Id. at 1170. The summary
affirmance by the Georgia Supreme Court was issued pursuant to Georgia Supreme Court
Rule 59, which may be afforded a preclusive effect. Id. at 1171. However, without a
written opinion by the Georgia Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit had no way to know
the grounds on which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision.
Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained that the fact that the district court's judgment
was pending appeal before the Eleventh Circuit does not mean that it was error for the
superior court to apply res judicata to the plaintiff's state court claims based on that
judgment. Id.
47. Id. at 1171 (citing Orion Tire Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 268 F.3d 1133,
1136 (9th Cir. 2001)).
48. Id. at 1172.
49. Id. Thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit turned to the merits of the appeal. Id.
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D. Whether The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars a Federal Suit Relating
to Events Occurring After the State Court Decision.
In Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp.,50 the Eleventh
Circuit considered whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to a
complaint brought in a federal district court relating to events occurring
after a state court entered its judgment.51
After litigating a breach-of-contract suit against Specialty Marketing
Corporation ("Specialty Marketing") in Alabama state court, Target
Media Partners ("Target Media") filed a defamation suit against
Specialty Marketing in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama, concerning letters Specialty Marketing
mailed to advertising agencies that worked with Target Media. 52
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the federal suit was
"inextricably intertwined" with the state court suit and dismissed the
federal claim as being jurisdictionally barred pursuant to the RookerFeldman doctrine.53
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine could bar a federal suit regarding events
occurring long after the entry of a state court decision. 54 The Eleventh
Circuit ultimately vacated and remanded the district court's decision,
finding that the defamation claim was not barred and the district court,
therefore, had jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 55 To determine the
scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit looked to
United States Supreme Court precedent,56 which applies the doctrine in
a way that only bars claims asserted by parties who lost in state court
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50. 881 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2018).
51. Id. at 1281.
52. Id. at 1281, 1283. In the complaint, Target Marketing alleged that these
communications were sent to the advertising agencies after the Alabama state court case
ended and that these communications discussed, in some detail, the trial and verdict of
the case. Id. at 1281.
53. Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine "eliminates
federal court jurisdiction over those cases that are essentially an appeal by a state court
loser seeking to relitigate a claim that has already been decided in a state court." Id. The
purpose of the doctrine is "to ensure that the inferior federal courts do not impermissibly
review decisions of the state courts—a role reserved to the United States Supreme Court."
Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that this jurisdiction bar is a narrow one and,
when "invoking the limitation on review of state court decisions, the federal courts must
also ensure that litigants whose claims are properly within the cognizance of the courts
are not denied a hearing." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1281, 1289.
56. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 281, 125 S. Ct.
1517, 1520, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005). See Target Media Partners, 881 F.3d at 1285.
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and then essentially request that a district court review and reject the
judgments of the state court.57
The Eleventh Circuit explained that in order to determine whether a
claim invites rejection of a state court decision, it applies an inquiry
that considers whether the claim was either (1) adjudicated by the state
court or (2) is "inextricably intertwined" with the state court
judgment.58
In addressing these two questions, the Eleventh Circuit first
determined that an allegedly tortious act occurring long after a state
court renders its judgment cannot be barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine because the party was not provided an opportunity to complain
about the alleged injurious act in the state court proceedings. 59 Second,
the Eleventh Circuit found that the defamation claim was neither the
same claim nor "inextricably intertwined" with the state court
judgment, because the claims before the Eleventh Circuit were
independent from those in the state court case.60 Therefore, because
there was neither a reasonable opportunity to raise the defamation
claim in the state court action and because the claim was not
"inextricably intertwined" with the judgment rendered in the state
court action, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine could not bar the suit and the district court had both the power
and obligation to hear the case.61
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57. Id. at 1285–86.
58. Id. at 1286. A claim is "inextricably intertwined" if it seeks to effectively nullify a
state court judgment or succeeds only to the extent that a state court wrongly decided
issues. Id. The Eleventh Circuit added that the class of federal claims it "found to be
'inextricably intertwined' with state court judgments is limited to those raising a question
that was or should have been properly before the state court," citing its decision in Casale
v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009), as an example. Id. In Casale, the
Eleventh Circuit held that though the state and federal claims were different in name,
their inquiry was essentially the same and where arguments, even those grounded in
federal law, are not offered to or accepted by the state court, they cannot be unloaded or
sold again in federal court. Id.
59. Id. at 1287.
60. Id. at 1287, 1289. The Eleventh Circuit explained that "the question posed to the
federal court must be intertwined with the state court judgment not only to the extent
that it involves the state court proceedings but also to the extent that a determination
reached by the state court would have to be relitigated in federal court." Id. at 1287
(internal quotations omitted). Specifically, the Court explained, "[i]t is not the factual
background of a case but the judgment rendered—that is, the legal and factual issues
decided in the state court and at issue in federal court—that must be under direct attack
for Rooker–Feldman to bar our reconsideration." Id.
61. Id. at 1289.
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III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. State Law Motion-To-Strike Procedure Created by the Georgia AntiSLAPP Statute Does Not Apply in Federal Court.
In Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc.,62 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed an issue of first impression regarding whether the motion-tostrike procedure of Georgia's anti-SLAPP63 statute (the "Statute"),
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, applies in federal court.64 The Eleventh Circuit
held that the Statute does not apply in federal court diversity cases due
to its conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.65
The lawsuit began after Cable News Network ("CNN") published
several allegedly defamatory news reports about Davide Carbone
("Carbone") and St. Mary's Medical Center (the "Hospital"), the hospital
that Carbone administered.66 Carbone filed a complaint against CNN in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, which CNN
moved to strike under the Statute or, in the alternative, to dismiss the
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).67 The district court denied CNN's motion,
ruling that the Statute's special-dismissal provision does not apply in
federal court because the provision conflicts with Rule 12(b)(6) and that
the complaint stated a claim for relief.68 CNN challenged both rulings
by interlocutory appeal.69
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of first
impression regarding whether the Statute applies to a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction. 70 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
denial of the motion to strike, concluding that the special-dismissal
provision of the Statute does not apply to a federal court exercising
diversity jurisdiction because the state Statute conflicts with the
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 98 Side A
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62. 910 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2018).
63. "SLAPP" stands for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.
64. Id. at 1347.
65. Id. at 1357.
66. Id. at 1347. Carbone alleged that while he served as the chief executive officer for
the Hospital, CNN published several allegedly false and defamatory articles, news
reports, and social media posts which intentionally misrepresented the mortality rate for
pediatric open-heart surgery at the Hospital compared to the national average. Id. at
1348. This, Carbone alleged, led to the Hospital discontinuing its pediatric cardiology
program and Carbone's resignation. Id.
67. Id. at 1347.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1350. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal of the denial of the motion
to dismiss, explaining that it could not exercise pendent jurisdiction over the denial of
CNN's motion to dismiss. Id. at 1357, 1359.
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Federal Rules.71 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the
issue before the court—whether the complaint stated a claim for relief
with sufficient evidentiary support to avoid pretrial dismissal—is
answered by Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56, and the answer under the
Federal Rules is at odds with the answer under the Statute. 72
The Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded by the decisions of several
sister circuits, which CNN cited and relied upon to try to show that
there was a special purpose for the Statute that was distinct from that
of the relevant Federal Rules. 73 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that Rules 8, 12, and 56 are valid under both the Rules
Enabling Act and the Constitution. 74 Based on this determination and
because the Federal Rules answer the same question as the Statute, the

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 98 Side B
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71. Id. at 1354. The Eleventh Circuit explained that "the Federal Rules and the
Georgia anti-SLAPP statute address the same question: whether a complaint states a
valid claim supported by sufficient evidence to warrant a trial on the merits." Id.
72. Id. at 1350. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the pleading
standard imposed by the Statute implements a probability requirement at the pleading
stage while, in contrast "the plausibility standard under Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6) plainly
does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). Further, while Georgia's Statute "contemplates a substantive, evidentiary
determination of the plaintiff's probability of prevailing on his claims[,]" to avoid
summary judgment under Federal Rule 56, "a nonmovant need only designate specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 1350–51(internal quotations
omitted).
73. Id. at 1355–56. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010); United States
ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999); see also
Block v. Tanenhaus, 815 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 2016); Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 706
n.6 (5th Cir. 2016); Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2013);
but see Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333–37 (D.C. Cir. 2015). For
example, the Ninth Circuit previously held that there was no conflict between California's
anti-SLAPP statute and the Federal Rules because that state's anti-SLAPP statute was
designed to serve an interest not directly addressed by the Federal Rules—constitutional
freedom of speech and petition for redress of grievances. Id. at 1356 (citing U.S. ex rel.
Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973). The Eleventh Circuit found that this argument failed to
appreciate a special purpose distinct from that of the relevant Federal Rules and,
therefore, was insufficient to eliminate the conflict. Id. at 1356.
74. Id. at 1357. The Eleventh Circuit explained that due to the conflict between the
Statute and the Federal Rules, the only other way the Statute could possibly apply in
diversity suits would be if Rules 8, 12, and 56 are "ultra vires" because they fall beyond
the scope of either Rules Enabling Act's power or congressional powers over federal
courts' operation. Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained that a federal rule does not exceed
the scope of its power under the Rules Enabling Act if it truly regulates procedure. Id.
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit explained that "[a] federal rule falls within Congress's
power under the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause) if it is rationally capable of classification as procedural." Id.
at 1357. The Eleventh Circuit found the Federal Rules to be valid under both. Id.
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Eleventh Circuit determined that the motion-to-strike procedure
created by the Statute cannot apply in federal court. 75
B. The Safe Harbor Provision of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act Does
Not Protect a Financial Institution from Challenges to the
Substance of Its Opt-In Agreements.

Id.
935 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2019).
15 U.S.C. § 1693m(d)(2).
935 F. 3d at 1244-45.
Id .at 1245.
Id. at 1234-35 (citing 12 C.F.R. §§ 1005.17(b)(1), 1005.17(d)).
Id. at 1233, 1236.
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1233-34.
Id. at 1235.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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In Tims v. LGE Community Credit Union,76 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed an issue of first impression among the federal appellate
courts of whether the Safe Harbor provision of the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act (EFTA)77 protects a financial institution from challenges to
the substance of its overdraft services opt-in agreements.78 Ultimately,
the Court concluded that the Safe Harbor provision applies to claims
about the form, but not the substance, of an institution's opt-in
agreements.79
Tims arises from a dispute over the method by which a financial
institution calculates account balances to determine whether an
overdraft occurred for the purposes of imposing an overdraft fee. 80 The
plaintiff, Ms. Tims, filed a consumer class action against her credit
union, LGE Community Credit Union, alleging that LGE promised to
use one account balance calculation method, but ended up using a
different method to calculate whether a transaction resulted in an
overdraft on her account.81 More specifically, Ms. Tims alleged that
LGE promised to impose overdraft fees only when her ledger balance –
the amount of money in her account without considering pending debits
– was insufficient to cover a transaction. 82 LGE instead calculated
overdraft fees when Ms. Tim's available balance – the money in her
account after considering pending debits and deposits – was insufficient
to cover a transaction. 83 Therefore, Ms. Tims incurred more than one
overdraft fee that she claims should not have been imposed. 84
Ms. Tims filed her case in U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as a claim
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Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1236-37.
Id. at 1237-42.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1235.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1238-39.
Id. at 1240-41.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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for violation of the EFTA based on LGE's failure to accurately describe
its overdraft services.85 LGE moved to dismiss Ms. Tims' claims and the
District Court granted the motion, finding that LGE's agreements with
Ms. Tims unambiguously allowed LGE to impose overdraft fees based
on Ms. Tims' available balance, not her ledger balance, and therefore
Ms. Tims did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 86 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the de novo District Court's order
granting LGE's Motion to Dismiss and the decision that the agreements
between LGE and Ms. Tims were unambiguous as to which balance
calculation method LGA employed to assess overdraft fees. 87
The Court employed a step-by-step analysis of whether the
agreements between Ms. Tims and LGE were indeed unambiguous. 88 As
its first step, the Court considered the language of the agreements
themselves.89 As between Ms. Tims and LGE there were two
agreements, the Opt-In Agreement and the Account Agreement. 90 The
Opt-In Agreement provides that "an overdraft occurs when you do not
have enough money in your account to cover a transaction." 91 It did not
say which balance calculation method – ledger balance or available
balance – that LGE used.92 The Court therefore found the plain
language of the Opt-In Agreement to be ambiguous as to which balance
calculation method LGE would use to assess overdraft fees. 93 Likewise,
the Eleventh Circuit determined that the plain language of the Account
Agreement did not unambiguously state which balance calculation
method LGE would use when determining whether to impose an
overdraft fee.94
The Court next considered whether Georgia Canons of contract
construction resolved the ambiguity in the Opt-In Agreement and
Account Agreement.95 The Court was not convinced that a reference to
"available balance" in another section of the Account Agreement, the
Funds Availability Disclosure, was likewise applicable to the Opt-In
Agreement or the Account Agreement's treatment of unsettled debit
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96. Id. at 1241-42.
97. Id. at 1242.
98. Id. at 1243.
99. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1693c(a)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1243 (citing 12 C.F.R. §§ 1005.17(d)(1), 1005.4(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 1693c).
102. Id. at 1244 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(d)(2). "The CFPB interprets the safe
harbor to preclude liability 'for failure to make disclosures in proper form' provided the
institution "uses [the model form's] clauses accurately to reflect its services." Id. (quoting
12 C.F.R. pt. 1005, app. A (Supp. I)).
103. 935 F.3d at 1234-35. LGE is required to use an opt-in notice for its overdraft
services that is "substantially similar" to Model Form A-9, and elected to use nearly an
exact copy.
104. Id. at 1244.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 100 Side A

transactions and overdrafts.96 Because the ambiguity of the contract
language itself could not be resolved by the Georgia canons of
construction, the Court concluded that the meaning of the contract
language – including whether it provided for LGE to use the ledger
balance or available balance calculation method for imposing overdraft
fees – should be left to a jury to decide. 97
The Eleventh Circuit next turned to an issue unique to Ms. Tims'
EFTA claim and the matter of first impression: whether LGA was
protected from the EFTA claim by its Safe Harbor provision. 98 The
Court spoke to a central feature of the EFTA, which is the requirement
that financial institutions disclose the terms and conditions of electronic
funds transfers involving consumer accounts in accordance with the
regulations of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"). 99
Among those CFPB regulations applicable to financial institutions is
Regulation E, which requires the institution to provide notice
describing its overdraft service. 100 That notice must be substantially
similar to Model Form A-9, provided by the Federal Reserve, and the
description of the overdraft service must be "clear and readily
understandable." 101 Pursuant to the Safe Harbor provision, an
institution is protected from EFTA liability for "any failure to make a
disclosure in proper form if a financial institution utilized an
appropriate model clause issued by the CFPB."102
In the case at hand, LGE's opt-in notice provided to Ms. Tims was
nearly identical to Model Form A-9.103 As such, LGE sought refuge in
the Safe Harbor provision.104 The Court noted, however, that the Model
Form A-9 has not dispelled all controversy and confusion surrounding
overdraft fees, and that Model Form A-9 does not address which
account balance calculation method should be used to determine
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whether a transaction results in overdraft. 105 Indeed, the Court found
LGE's Opt-In Agreement to suffer the same flaw, as discussed above. 106
Furthermore, the Court concluded that Ms. Tims' claim was not one
over the form of LGE's opt-in notice; rather, it was over the substance of
the notice and, more particularly, its failure to describe the service in a
clear and readily understandable way as required. 107 In so concluding,
that Court reasoned that making disclosure in proper form means
"making the disclosure according to proper procedures." 108 Therefore,
the Safe Harbor provision insulates an institution from claims based on
the means by which the institution communicates its overdraft polity,
but not from claims based on an alleged failure to make an adequate
disclosure.109 Because the Safe Harbor provision does not apply to Ms.
Tims' claim based on the adequacy of LGE's disclosure about its
overdraft services, and because she stated such a claim plausibly in
light of the ambiguity of her agreements with LGE, the Court also
reversed the District Court's decision to dismiss the EFTA claim. 110
C. Whether a "Guarantor" Constitutes an "Applicant" Under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act.
In Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource PA,111 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed a circuit split among sister circuits of whether, under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (the "Act"), 112 a guarantor constitutes an
"applicant" and has standing to assert a claim under the Act. 113
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit agrees with the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits that the ordinary meaning of "applicant" under the Act does
not include a "guarantor" and thus a guarantor has no standing to
assert a claim under the Act.114
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 100 Side B
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105. Id. at 1235.
106. Id. at 1238-39.
107. Id. at 1245.
108. Id. at 1244.
109. Id. at 1244-45.
110. Id. at 1245.
111. 936 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2019).
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(a), 1691a(b).
113. 936 F.3d at 1187. Under the Act, it is unlawful for "any creditor to discriminate
against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transactions . . . on the basis
of . . . marital status." Id. at 1189-90 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)-(a)(1)).
114. Id. at 1193 (citing Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 (8th Cir.
2014), aff'd by an equally divided court—U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 194 L.Ed.2d 163 (2016)
(holding that a "guarantor" unambiguously is not an "applicant" under the Act) and
Morgan Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atl. Akt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (same)).
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The lawsuit giving rise to this appeal was filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida where Plaintiff Regions Bank
("Regions") filed a complaint after the default of two separate loans. 115
In response to the complaint filed by Regions, the Defendants 116
asserted counterclaims for violation of the Act, alleging that Regions
discriminated on the basis of marital status when it required Mr. and
Mrs. Phoenix and Legal Outsource to guarantee the Periwinkle Loan. 117
Ultimately, the District Court disposed of the counterclaims, holding,
among other things, that the guarantor Defendants were not
"applicants" under the respective Loans and had no standing to assert
claims under the Act.118 After the District Court entered judgment in
favor of Regions, the Defendants appealed the judgment. 119
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused on whether the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment against Ms. Phoenix's
counterclaim under the Act.120 The Act defines an "applicant" as "any
person who applies to a creditor directly for . . . credit, or applies to a
creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an amount
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115. Id. at 1187-88. Legal Outsource PA ("Legal Outsource") was the borrower under
the Outsource Loan, which was guaranteed by Charles Phoenix ("Mr. Phoenix"). Id. at
1187. Periwinkle Partners, LLC ("Periwinkle") was the borrower under the Periwinkle
Loan, which was guaranteed by Mr. Phoenix, Lisa Phoenix ("Mrs. Phoenix") and Legal
Outsource. Id. at 1187-88. Under the Periwinkle Loan, a default by any of the involved
parties, including the guarantors, on the Legal Outsource Loan, constituted a default
under the Periwinkle Loan. Id. at 1188. Regions concluded the Outsource and Periwinkle
Loans were in default in 2013 after the applicable parties failed to provide requested
financial information and after Periwinkle failed to pay its property taxes. Id.
116. Mr. and Mrs. Phoenix, Legal Outsource and Periwinkle are collectively referred to
as "Defendants."
117. Id. Three of the counterclaims were individually brought by Mr. Phoenix, Mrs.
Phoenix and Legal Outsource and the fourth counterclaim was brought jointly by Mrs.
Phoenix and Periwinkle Partners. Id.
118. Id. In response to Regions moving to dismiss the counterclaims, the District Court
granted the motion, in part, holding that the guarantors of the Periwinkle Loan lacked
statutory standing because they were not "applicants" under the Act. Id. However, the
District Court denied the motion, in part, holding that the counterclaim asserted jointly
by Mrs. Phoenix and Periwinkle Partners sufficiently alleged that they were "applicants"
under the Act. Id. After Regions moved for summary judgment, the District Court granted
the motion, holding, among other things, that not only is Periwinkle as an entity
incapable of having a "marital status" but also that Ms. Phoenix failed to provide any
evidence that she was an "applicant" for the Periwinkle Loan since she was only a
guarantor. Id.
119. Id. at 1188-89.
120. Id. The Eleventh Circuit concludes that the remaining "host of issues" raised by
Defendants with respect to the nature of the defaults under the Loans lack any merit. Id.
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit concludes that Periwinkle abandoned its claim that it
was an "applicant" under the Act for the Periwinkle Loan. Id.
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exceeding a previously established credit limit." 121 Further, the Federal
Reserve Board (the "Board")122 defines an "applicant" as "any person
who requests or who has received an extension of credit from a creditor"
which includes "any person who is or may become contractually liable
regarding an extension of credit" and could include "guarantors." 123 On
appeal, Mrs. Phoenix relies on the definition of "applicant" under the
Board regulations to argue that she, as a guarantor, has standing to
assert a claim under the Act.124
Following a thorough analysis, the Eleventh Circuit concludes that a
"guarantor" is not an "applicant" under the Act and affirms the District
Court's ruling.125 First, the Eleventh Circuit looks to the Act's statutory
text and concludes that because an "applicant" is one who requests
something "to benefit himself" and a "guarantor" is one who "makes a
promise related to the applicant's request," a guarantor does not fit
within the Act's definition of "applicant." 126 Next, the Eleventh Circuit
analyzes the entire text of the Act and its usage of the term "applicant"
to confirm that the term refers to "a first-party applicant" for credit and
does not encompass a guarantor.127 Judge Rosenbaum writes a lengthy
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121. Id. at 1189-90 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b)) (emphasis in original).
122. Under the Act, the Board is required to promulgate regulations to enforce the Act.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691b).
123. Id. at 1190 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e)).
124. Id.
125. Id at 1190-1200.
126. Id. at 1191. The Eleventh Circuit applies the "traditional tools of statutory
construction" in reviewing the statutory text and "proceed[s] from the understanding that
unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with
their ordinary meaning." Id. at 1190 (internal citations omitted). When the Act was
adopted in 1974, it defined "applicant" as "any person who applies to a creditor directly
for . . . credit, or applies to a creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an
amount exceeding a previously established credit limit." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b))
(emphasis in original). The Eleventh Circuit also refers to the definition of "apply" from
multiple English-language dictionaries both before and after the enactment of the Act to
conclude that the term "apply" means "a request for something." Id. at 1190-91 (internal
citations omitted). Similarly, the dictionaries define "guaranty" to mean "a promise by a
guarantor to answer for the payment of some debt if the person liable in the first instance
is unable to pay." Id. at 1191 (internal citations omitted). Finally, the Court refers to the
analysis from other Circuits with respect to the definition of "apply" to mean "a
request . . . usually for something of benefit to oneself." Id. (citing Hawkins, 761 F.3d at
941 and RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., 754 F.3d 380 (6th
Cir. 2014).
127. Id. at 1192. The Eleventh Circuit applies the "whole-text" canon which refers to
the principle that a "judicial interpreter should consider the entire text, in view of its
structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts" and the "consistentusage" canon which refers to the principle that "a word or phrase is presumed to bear the
same meaning throughout a text unless context requires otherwise." Id. (internal citations
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Dissenting Opinion focusing on a different interpretation of the scope of
an "applicant" under the Act.128
The Dissenting Opinion in this case argues that the ordinary
meaning of the word "applicant" reasonably includes guarantors, in
part because if the definition of "apply" means to "make an appeal or
request usually for something of benefit to oneself" then it must
sometimes be "for something of benefit to another."129 Next, the
Dissenting Opinion contends that the Eleventh Circuit's analysis "fails
to reflect the overriding national policy against discrimination that
underlies the [Act].130 Finally, the Dissenting Opinion contends that
"Congress acquiesced to the [Federal Reserve's] definition of 'applicant'
by failing to amend the Act to expressly preclude the [Federal
Reserve's] definition."131 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit did not find
the Dissenting Opinion's analysis persuasive in its attempt to include a
"guarantor" within the Act's definition and use of "applicant." 132 Ms.
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omitted). The Court cites heavily on Judge Colloton's concurring opinion in Hawkins
which explains that the term "applicant" "is only compatible with a first-party applicant
who requests credit to benefit herself." Id. at 1192-93 (citing Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 94344).
128. See generally Dissenting Op. The Dissenting Opinion also argues that Mrs.
Phoenix and Periwinkle abandoned their counterclaim under the Act by "failing to raise
[it] plainly and prominently enough in the [] initial brief." Id. at 1197. Although the
Eleventh Circuit agrees that the initial brief "is no model of clarity," reading the initial
brief in light of the record and other briefs in the appeal make it clear that the
counterclaim was never abandoned. Id. at 1197-1200
129. Regions Bank, 936 F.3d at 1193-94 (citing Dissenting Op. at 1212-13). The
Dissenting Opinion also focuses on the Act's use of the word "any" in certain relevant
sections to suggest that Congress therefore intended for the Act to "have expansive
reach." Id. at 1193-94. However, the Eleventh Circuit concludes that "under the usual
meaning, an 'applicant' who 'applies for credit' is one who requests credit to benefit
herself, not credit to benefit a third party." Id. at 1194 (citing Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 943
(Colloton, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 1193-94 (citing Dissenting Op. at 1219). The Eleventh Circuit wholly rejects
the Dissenting Opinion's attempt to apply the "familiar canon of statutory construction
that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes" as it has
consistently been rejected by the Supreme Court and consistently labeled as a "false
canon." Id. at 1194-95 (internal citations omitted).
131. Id. (citing Dissenting Op. at 1220-22). The Eleventh Circuit recognizes that
"congressional inaction can, in limited circumstances, support an inference that Congress
has acquiesced to an agency or judicial interpretation," it is well-established that
"legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in construing a statute" and "congressional
silence alone is ordinarily not enough to infer acquiescence." Id at 1196-97 (internal
citations omitted).
132. Id.
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Phoenix has submitted a Petition for Certiorari, which has been
docketed. 133
D. Whether the Americans with Disabilities Act Protects Persons
"Regarded As Having" the Potential or Possibility to Develop a
Disability.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

133. See Lisa M. Phoenix v. Regions Bank, U.S. Supreme Court, 19-815.
134. 938 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2019).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
136. 938 F.3d at 1314-15.
137. Id. at 1318.
138. Id. at 1311.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1311-12. There was no dispute that Ms. Lowe did not suffer from an actual
disability at the time of her termination.
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In E.E.O.C. v. STME, LLC,134 the Eleventh Circuit decided an issue
of first impression as to the meaning of the phrase "regarded as having
such an impairment" contained in the American's with Disabilities Act
of 1990135 at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).136 The Court held that the EEOC's
claim that the defendant-employer perceived its employee as having the
potential to develop a disability when it terminated her was insufficient
to state a "regarded as" disabled claim under the ADA.137
This case began with a Charge of Discrimination filed by Kimberly
Lowe ("Ms. Lowe") against her employer, STME, LLC d/b/a Massage
Envy-South Tampa ("Massage Envy").138 In 2014, Ms. Lowe requested
leave from work to travel to the country of Ghana to visit family. 139
Massage Envy initially agreed to the leave but days prior to the trip,
the owner threatened to terminate Ms. Lowe if she kept her travel
plans.140 This threat was alleged to have been made out of concern that
Ms. Lowe would become infected with Ebola during her trip and bring
the virus back, infecting others.141 When Ms. Lowe refused to cancel her
trip, Massage Envy terminated her employment. 142 When she returned
from Ghana, not having contracted Ebola, Ms. Lowe filed her Charge
claiming she was discriminated against because Massage Envy
perceived her as disabled or as having the potential to become disabled,
in violation of the ADA.143 The EEOC issued its Letter of
Determination, finding reasonable cause to believe that Massage Envy
terminated Ms. Lowe because it regarded her as disabled, and
subsequently filed its suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
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District of Florida.144 Massage Envy moved to dismiss the complaint,
the district court granted the motion, and this appeal arises from that
order.145
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo,
and focused its inquiry on the meaning of "regarded as having" a
disability as used in the ADA and whether Ms. Lowe was "regarded as
having" a disability when fired.146 Starting with the statutory text
itself, the Court referred to 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1), which defines
"disability" to include:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in
paragraph (3)).147
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144. Id. at 1312.
145. Id. at 1313.
146. Id. at 1313-18.
147. Id. at 1314 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1))(emphasis in original).
148. Id. at 1315 (citing Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int'l, LLC, 746 F.ed 1264, 1267-68
(11th Cir. 2014); E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir.
2009) Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1306 n.5 (11th Cir. 2000)).
149. Id. at 1315-16 (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143, 114 S. Ct. 655660, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484, 110 S. Ct. 2499, 2504,
110 L.Ed.2d 438 (1990)).
150. Id. at 1316.
151. Id. at 1316 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12103(3)(A)).
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The Court acknowledged that it is well settled that the reference to
"impairment" in part (A) of the definition of "disability" is limited to
impairments that exist at the time of the adverse employment action
and does not include impairments that manifest after the alleged
discrimination.148 With that in mind, the Court reasoned that
"impairment" in part (C), the "regarded as" prong of the statute, has the
same meaning, particularly where part (C) refers to "such an
impairment."149 Therefore, the Court held that in "regarded as" cases, a
plaintiff must show the employer either knew that the employee had an
actual impairment, or perceived the employee to have such an
impairment, at the time of the adverse employment action.150
Additionally, the Court held that an individual meets the requirement
of being regarded as disabled only if she was fired "because of an actual
or perceived impairment."151 When an employer does not perceive the

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 103 Side B

05/29/2020 07:30:56

[10] TRIAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CP (DO NOT DELETE)

1108

MERCER LAW REVIEW

5/20/2020 8:33 AM

[Vol. 71

employee to be impaired at the time of the employment decision, then
the employer has not terminated the employer because of a perceived
impairment.152
In the case at hand, the EEOC did not allege that Massage Envy
perceived Ms. Lowe as impaired at the time it terminated her, prior to
her trip to Ghana.153 Rather, the EEOC alleged that Massage Envy
perceived Ms. Lowe as having the potential or possibility of becoming
disabled in the future.154 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with several
other Circuits by declining to extend the protections of the "regarded
as" prong of the statute to claims that an employer believed its
employee might develop an impairment in the future.155 It considered
its decision consistent with the EEOC's interpretive guidance, 156 and
not inconsistent with the ADA's direction that "disability" should be
construed broadly,157 because the statute nonetheless does not protect
anyone who may experience a future disability.158 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court and upheld its dismissal
on the grounds that the EEOC did not state a "regarded as" disabled
claim against Massage Envy because it did not allege that Massage
Envy perceived Ms. Lowe as having an existing impairment at the time
it terminated her.159
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152. Id.
153. Id.at 1318.
154. Id. at 1315.
155. Id. (citing EEOC v. BNSF Ry. Co., 902 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2018); Adair v. City
of Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297, 1306 (10th Cir. 2016); Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d
1104, 1113 (8th Cir. 2016)).
156. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(h) (stating that characteristic predisposition to
illness or disease does not constitute physical impairment under the ADA). The Eleventh
Circuit analogized that if predisposition does not constitute impairment, then Ms. Lowe's
heightened risk of contracting disease through her travels is also not an impairment
within the meaning of the ADA. 938 F.3d at 1317.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4)(A).
158. Id. at 1316-17.
159. Id. at 1318. The Eleventh Circuit also upheld the District Court's decision
dismissing the EEOC's claim of association discrimination. Id. at 1319-20. That claim was
based on the contention that Massage Envy violated the ADA by firing Ms. Lowe based on
her association with people in Ghana whom Massage Envy believed to be disabled. Id. at
1319. The Court agreed with the District Court that there was no allegation Massage
Envy knew Lowe had an association with a specific disabled person in Ghana. Id. Further
it was far too attenuated to maintain an association discrimination claim based on
suspected contacted with certain unknown individuals though to have Ebola, as the ADA
requires both a known association and a known disability. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)). The Court also agreed with the district court that under the circumstances it
would be futile for the EEOC to amend its complaint, and therefore upheld the denial of
the EEOC's motion for leave to amend. Id. at 1320-21. Likewise, the Court agreed with

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 104 Side A

05/29/2020 07:30:56

[10] TRIAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CP (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

TRIAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

5/20/2020 8:33 AM

1109

IV. CLASS ACTIONS
A. To Become a Party to a FLSA Collective Action, Opt-In Plaintiffs
Become Parties Upon Their Filing of Consents To Lawsuit, and a
Conditional Class Certification Order is not Required.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

the denial of Ms. Lowe's motion to intervene as a plaintiff in this case, as her own claims
suffer from the same flaws as the EEOC's claims. Id. at 1322-23.
160. 887 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018).
161. Id. at 1273–74.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1274.
164. Id. (referencing conditional class certification procedures in Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001)).
165. Id. (citing NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GA. LOCAL RULE 7.1(A)(2)).
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In Mickles v. Country Club Inc.,160 the Eleventh Circuit decided an
issue of first impression whether opt-in plaintiffs become parties to the
lawsuit upon filing their opt-in consents with the court, or upon the
court's order of conditional class certification in accordance with 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). In Mickles,
the original plaintiff, Mickles, sued Country Club Inc. ("Country Club"),
on behalf of herself and all other similarly-situated employees, in a
collective action lawsuit under the FLSA, alleging that she and other
employees had been improperly classified by Country Club as
independent contractors, and they had failed to receive appropriate
minimum wage and overtime compensation.161 Country Club answered
and filed counterclaims against Mickles and any other plaintiff who
joined the lawsuit for money had and received, unjust enrichment, and
breach of contract.162
After Country Club filed its Answer, other employees opted into the
litigation by filing consents to become party plaintiffs. 163 In total, three
additional plaintiffs filed consents, and the case moved into and
through discovery over the next approximately six months. After the
discovery period expired, Mickles filed a motion for conditional
certification of a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 164
The district court denied the motion for conditional certification
because Mickles waited until after the discovery period to file the
motion when the court's local rules and the case management order
required all motions to have been filed within 30 days after the
beginning of discovery.165 The district court found that the motion for
conditional certification was untimely because it was filed nearly eight
months after the deadline, Mickles did not obtain prior permission of
the court to file the motion after the deadline, and Mickles had been
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166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1274–75.
169. Id. at 1275.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1277 n.7 (citing Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215,
225 (3d Cir. 2016)).
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"well aware that there were other plaintiffs who were similarly situated
and wished to opt-in before the deadline for filing the motion for
conditional certification."166 The district court rejected Mickles'
argument that granting the motion for conditional certification would
serve the interests of judicial economy because "it would allow other
potential plaintiffs to join this action, rather than forcing the plaintiffs
to file separate actions," instead finding that allowing conditional class
certification would require reopening discovery which would force
additional costs.167
Notably, the district court's order made no mention of the three
additional plaintiffs who had filed opt-in consents to become party
plaintiffs before or shortly after the discovery period had begun. 168 The
parties then sought clarification from the district court about whether
the three additional plaintiffs remained parties in the action, Country
Club believing only Mickles was a party, and Mickles and the opt-ins
believing they all remained party plaintiffs. The district court entered a
clarification order stating that the three additional plaintiffs who had
filed consents to opt-in to the case were never adjudicated to be
similarly situated to Mickles, and were therefore never added as party
plaintiffs to the collective action. 169 Mickles then settled her claims with
Country Club, but the three opt-in plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit claiming the district court erred in the class certification order,
the clarification order, and by approving Mickles' settlement with
Country Club.170
The Eleventh Circuit had to decide, as a matter of first impression,
whether the opt-in plaintiffs were made parties to the litigation by
filing their respective consents, or whether the opt-in plaintiffs never
became parties as the district court held. The Eleventh Circuit found
that no circuit had ever considered this issue, making it an issue of first
impression in all circuits.171 The Court analyzed the typical process for
conditional certification in FLSA collective actions under Hipp v.
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., and found that the plain language of § 216(b)
supports the conclusion that those who opt-in to the lawsuit become
party plaintiffs upon the filing of their consents with the district court
and that nothing further, such as conditional certification, is required
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for them to become parties. 172 The Court underscored that the
conditional certification process in the FLSA, and the procedures
outlined in Hipp, require the parties to send court-approved written
notice to potential class members who then become party plaintiffs by
filing their written consents with the district court.173 Although the
FLSA also requires an opt-in plaintiff to be similarly situated to the
named plaintiff – a finding that was not made prior to the three opt-ins
in Mickles—the opt-in plaintiffs remain parties to the action until the
district court determines that they are not similarly situated and
dismisses them.174 Thus, although there had been no affirmative or
express finding by the district court that the three opt-in plaintiffs were
similarly-situated to Mickles, their filing of consents to opt-in to the
litigation made them parties to the lawsuit until a finding that they
were not similarly-situated, which never happened.175 Thus, the three
non-settling opt-in plaintiffs were indeed parties to the litigation and
had standing to appeal the orders of the district court.
B. Bank That Moved to Compel Arbitration Years Into Class Action
Lawsuit Did Not Waive Arbitration Rights.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

172. Id. at 1278 (citing Prickett v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003)).
173. Id. at 1277 (citing Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 75 (2013)).
174. Id. at 1278.
175. Id.
176. 889 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2018).
177. Gutierrez, 889 F.3d at 1233–34. The Wells Fargo cases were consolidated by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation with numerous other cases against other banks
throughout the country. Id. at 1234.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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In Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank,176 the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
district court order that had denied Wells Fargo's motion to compel
arbitration filed years into the litigation. The class action lawsuits were
filed in 2008 and 2009 for claims alleging improper charging of
overdraft fees.177 Wells Fargo bank accounts were governed by customer
agreements with arbitration provisions that required individual, not
class, arbitrations.178 The district court entered an order requiring all
"merits and non-merits motions directed to the operative complaints,"
including motions to compel arbitration, to be filed by December 8,
2009.179 Wells Fargo joined in other banks' motions to dismiss but did
not move to compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims. 180 The
district court denied the motions to dismiss and noted that many banks
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
563 U.S. 333 (2011).
Gutierrez, 889 F.3d at 1234.
Id.
Id. at 1234–35.
Id.
Id. at 1235.
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181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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did not move to compel arbitration. Thus, the district court ordered the
defendants wishing to compel arbitration to file such motions by April
19, 2010.181
Wells Fargo again did not move to compel arbitration and instead,
filed a reply to the court's order confirming it would not move to compel
arbitration against the named plaintiffs, but reserved its rights against
any plaintiffs who may later join the litigation individually or as a
putative class member.182 Wells Fargo then filed its answers in which it
stated that absent members of the putative classes are obligated to
arbitrate their claims against the bank. 183 Thereafter, the parties
engaged in class-related discovery over the next year.184 Then, on April
27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion,185 and held that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 2, preempts state law rules that voided consumer arbitration
agreements that barred class-wide arbitration procedures.186 The
Concepcion decision prompted Wells Fargo to quickly move to compel
the named plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against Wells Fargo. 187
The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration of the
named plaintiffs finding that the bank had waived its arbitration rights
against the named plaintiffs by not timely filing a motion to compel
arbitration before the extensive discovery and litigation proceedings
that occurred after the motions to dismiss were denied. 188 Wells Fargo
appealed and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to
compel the named plaintiffs to arbitrate.189
When the case returned to the district court, Wells Fargo opposed
class certification by arguing that the class lacked numerosity because
all customers were bound by enforceable arbitration provisions and
would have to be excluded from the class. At the same time it filed its
opposition to class certification, Wells Fargo filed conditional motions to
compel arbitration against the unnamed class members (not against the
named plaintiffs) in case the court certified the class. 190 The district
court denied the conditional motion to compel arbitration without
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191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1237.
196. Id. at 1236 (citing Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315–16
(11th Cir. 2002); S&H Contractors v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507, 1514 (11th Cir.
1990)).
197. Gutierrez, 889 F.3d at 1236.
198. Id. at 1237.
199. Id.
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ruling on class cert.191 Wells Fargo appealed and the Eleventh Circuit
vacated the ruling because without a certified class, the district court
lacked jurisdiction to bind unnamed putative class members and the
named plaintiffs lacked standing to argue the rights of unnamed
putative class members.192
On remand, the district court immediately granted class certification
and so Wells Fargo immediately moved to compel arbitration of the
unnamed class members.193 The district court denied the motion to
compel arbitration, holding that Wells Fargo waived the right to compel
arbitration because it acted inconsistently with its arbitration rights
and significant prejudice would result if Wells Fargo were allowed to
compel arbitration.194
Again on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Wells Fargo argued that it
did not act inconsistently with its rights to arbitration and did not
waive its right to arbitrate claims of the unnamed class members. 195
The Court discussed the two-tier inquiry for determining whether a
party has waived its arbitration rights: (1) whether under the totality of
the circumstances the party has acted inconsistently with the
arbitration right, and (2) if so, whether the party's conduct has in some
way prejudiced the other party.196 The Court found that the "key
ingredient" in the waiver analysis is fair notice to the opposing party
and the court of a party's arbitration rights and the party's intent to
exercise them.197
Applied to the facts of the Wells Fargo case, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the bank had not waived its right to arbitrate against the
unnamed class members because it did not act inconsistently with its
arbitration rights as to those parties. 198 The Court found that Wells
Fargo's conduct with respect to the unnamed class members "differed
starkly" from its conduct as to the named plaintiffs. 199 The Court found
significant that prior to any discovery being conducted, Wells Fargo had
informed the district court and the named plaintiffs that although it
would not seek arbitration against the named plaintiffs, the bank
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intended to preserve its rights to arbitrate any claims of unnamed
plaintiffs when the matter became ripe for the court to consider them. 200
Also, the bank cited the parties' arbitration agreements as affirmative
defenses in its answers, which had the effect of putting the district
court and the plaintiffs on notice of Wells Fargo's arbitration rights and
the bank's intent to invoke them.201 The Court also addressed the issue
of Wells Fargo's failure to meet the district court's deadline to move for
arbitration by December 8, 2009 by finding, first, the district court's
order was unclear on the issue, 202 and second, it would have been
impossible for the bank to have filed a motion to compel arbitration of
unnamed non-parties because the district court would have lacked
jurisdiction to rule on such a motion prior to certification. 203 Finally, the
appellate court rejected the district court's statement that the bank
could have moved to compel arbitration at the outset as to the named
plaintiffs which, if successful, would have extinguished the unnamed
class members' claims.204 The Court held that there is no authority that
requires a party to file a conditional arbitration motion as to possible
future adversaries to avoid waiving such claims – especially at a time
when the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. 205 Wells
Fargo accomplished its requirement of putting the court and named
plaintiffs on notice of its intent to compel arbitration of the unnamed
putative class members by its conduct including the filed reservation of
rights and the statements in its answers.206
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200. Id.
201. Id. The Court distinguished its holding from its opinion in Garcia v. Wachovia
Corp., 699 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2012), where the Court found that Wells Fargo acted
inconsistently with its arbitration rights as to the named plaintiffs because the issue in
Gutierrez was whether the bank waived its arbitration rights as to the unnamed
plaintiffs. Gutierrez, 889 F.3d at 1237 n. 9.
202. Id. at 1237–38. The Court found the district court's order even suggested that
motions to compel arbitration as to the unnamed members of the putative class should
come later by specifying the motions due were motions "directed to the operative
complaints on file." Id. at 1238 n.9. Moreover, the order did not mention the unnamed
class members.
203. Gutierrez at 1238–39 (discussing In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig. (SpearsHaymond I), 780 F.3d 1031, 1034, 1037 (11th Cir. 2015)).
204. Id. at 1239.
205. Id.
206. Id. Because the Court found that Wells Fargo had not acted inconsistently with
its arbitration rights, the Court did not address the second tier of the inquiry – prejudice
to the non-moving party. Id. at 1239 n.10.
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V. ARBITRATION
A. Whether under the Federal Arbitration Act a Non-Party to an
International Arbitration Agreement Can Compel a Party to
Arbitration Who Did Sign the Agreement.

902 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2018).
9 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.
902 F.3d at 1322-23, 1325-26.
396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).
902 F.3d at 1325-27.
Id. at 1320.
Id.
Id. at 1320-21.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
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In Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS,207 the
Eleventh Circuit addressed two similar issues under the portions of the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")208 applicable to international
arbitrations using the same factors: (i) how to determine federal subject
matter jurisdiction on a motion to remand, and (ii) whether a party can
be compelled to arbitration by a non-party to the arbitration
agreement.209 Using the factors announced in the Court's 2005 opinion
in Bautista v. Star Cruises,210 the Court found that, using a "very
limited inquiry," the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction,
but applying a "more rigorous" inquiry of the same factors did not
support compelling the dispute to arbitration where the party seeking
to compel arbitration was not a signatory to the agreement containing
the arbitration clause.211
Outokumpu operates a steel plant in Alabama, formerly operated by
ThyssenKrupp Stainless USA, LLC ("TK").212 In 2007, while the plant
was under construction, TK entered three contracts to purchase three
different sized cold rolling mills used in the plant. 213 Each of the
contracts were with an entity known as "Fives," and each contained an
arbitration clause requiring the parties to arbitrate their disputes. 214
The parties were defined as Outokumpu and Fives, but when referring
to Fives, it would also include its subcontractors. 215 After the parties
entered their contracts, Fives entered subcontracts with GE Energy
Conversion France SAS ("GE") which supplied the motors for the cold
rolling machines.216
When the motors failed, Outokumpu approached Fives and learned
that Fives and GE had their own arbitration agreement that purported
to allow Fives to join GE in any arbitration that might occur between
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Outokumpu and Fives.217 Outokumpu sued GE in state court in
Alabama and GE removed to federal court, alleging subject matter
jurisdiction based on 9 U.S.C. § 205, also known as part of the "New
York Convention" codified in the FAA applicable to arbitrations
involving a foreign party. 218 Outokumpu filed a motion to remand to
state court and GE filed a motion to dismiss the action and compel
arbitration.219 The district court found the removal proper and that it
had subject matter jurisdiction under the New York Convention and
FAA and also granted the motion to compel Outokumpu to arbitrate its
claims against GE.220
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit described the two issues before it as
follows:
This appeal requires us to examine seemingly interrelated – but
actually quite separate – questions under the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York
Convention" or "Convention"): (1) whether an action between a buyer
and a sub-contractor of a seller "relates to" and arbitration
agreement signed by the buyer and seller sufficient to establish
federal subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) whether a non-signatory
sub-contractor may compel arbitration against the buyer under that
arbitration agreement.221
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217. Id. at 1321-22.
218. Id. at 1322. Outokumpu had also joined its insurers as plaintiffs and GE alleged
fraudulent joinder of the insurers, thereby also providing the court with diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1320.
222. Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2002).
223. Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005).
224. 902 F.3d at 1320.
225. Id. (citing Bautista, 396 F.3d 1289, 1294 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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The Court, following opinions from the Fifth 222 and Second223
Circuits, found that these two questions must be bifurcated and
analyzed separately.224
For the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court stated that on
a motion for remand, the district court shall first perform a limited
inquiry on the face of the pleadings and removal notice to determine
whether the case "relates to" an arbitration agreement falling under the
Convention under the factors articulated in Bautista v. Star Cruises.225
Assuming there is subject matter jurisdiction under this limited
inquiry, the district court must then decide the motion to compel
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arbitration by engaging in a "more rigorous analysis" of the Bautista
factors to determine whether the parties entered into an agreement to
arbitrate within the meaning of the Convention.226
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court on the issue of
jurisdiction. Engaging only in a limited inquiry based only on the
pleadings, the question was whether, as provided in 9 U.S.C. § 205, the
subject matter of the action related to an arbitration agreement falling
under the Convention.227 The phrase "falling under the Convention" is
defined in 9 U.S.C. § 202,228 but the statute does not define "relates to
an arbitration agreement."229 The Court adopted the analysis of sister
Circuits on the meaning of this phrase and held that "relates to"
provides broad removability of cases to federal court. 230 The Court
stated that the arbitration agreement need only be sufficiently related
to the dispute such that it conceivably affects the outcome of the case,
and defined the test as follows:
[A]s long as the argument that the case "relates to" the arbitration
agreement is not immaterial, frivolous, or made solely to obtain
jurisdiction, the relatedness requirement is met for purposes of
federal subject matter jurisdiction.231

05/29/2020 07:30:56

226. Id.
227. Id. at 1323.
228. 9 U.S.C. § 202 essentially says that the Convention covers arbitration agreements
or awards that are commercial in nature and excludes agreements arising out of
relationships entirely between citizens of the United States (unless it involves property
located abroad or contemplates performance or enforcement abroad). See Outokumpu
Stainless, 902 F.3d at 1323, quoting 9 U.S.C. § 202.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1323-24.
231. Id. at 1323-24.
232. E.g., there is an agreement in writing, that provides for arbitration in the
territory of a signatory to the Convention, arises from a commercial relationship, and a
party to the agreement is not an American citizen. Outokumpu Stainless, 902 F.3d at
1324, citing Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1295-96 n.7 & 9.
233. Id. at 1324-25.
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The Court further instructed that if the removing party has
articulated a non-frivolous basis for meeting the four factors in
Bautista,232 and looking only to the pleadings and removal notice, if
there is a non-frivolous basis to conclude the agreement sufficiently
relates to the case before the court such that the arbitration agreement
could conceivably affect the outcome of the case, the district court has
jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 205.233 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with
the district court that in this limited inquiry, the case met the four
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234. Id. at 1324-25.
235. Id. at 1327.
236. Id. at 1325.
237. Id. at 1326.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1326-27. See also Czarina, LLC v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286 (11th
Cir. 2004) and Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017).
241. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, No. 16-0378-KD-C, 2019 WL
1748110, at *1 (S.D. Ala. April 18, 2019).
242. Id. at *2.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 108 Side B

Bautista factors and sufficiently related to the Outokumpu arbitration
agreement with Fives.234
For the issue of compelling arbitration, the Court shifted from the
"limited inquiry" for jurisdiction to a "rigorous inquiry" of the same
factors, but found that although the allegations were sufficient to
establish jurisdiction, the evidence was insufficient for GE to compel
Outokumpu to arbitration.235 The Court stated that its inquiry "starts
and ends with the first factor" because there was no agreement in
writing within the meaning of the Convention.236 The Court found that
the New York Convention, codified in Chapter 2 of the FAA, only allows
the enforcement of agreements in writing signed by the parties. 237
Because the Outokumpu and Fives were the parties to the contracts
containing the arbitration clauses, there was no agreement in writing
signed by the parties – Outokumpu and GE. Although GE was a Fives
subcontractor and the Fives-Outokumpu contract provided that
references to Fives would apply to its subcontractors, GE was a
stranger to the contracts signed by Outokumpu and Fives at the time
they entered those agreements.238 The Court found that at most, GE
was a "potential subcontractor" at the time of the Outokumpu contracts
and was thus "undeniably not a signatory to the Contracts." 239
Accordingly, to compel arbitration under the Convention, the
arbitration agreement must be signed by each of the parties to the
litigation or their privies. Since GE was not a signatory or a privy of a
signatory, the Court reversed and remanded to the district court. 240
On remand, the district court rejected GE's arguments that the case
should remain in federal court.241 GE insisted that since the Eleventh
Circuit had found that denial of the motion to remand was properly
denied, the case should not be remanded merely because the appellate
court refused to compel arbitration. 242 The district court disagreed and
remanded to state court, holding that the Eleventh Circuit's finding of
fact that there is no agreement in writing within the meaning of the
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Convention "makes GE Energy's assertion to the contrary, frivolous." 243
Meanwhile, GE petitioned for certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court in February 2019, and the high Court granted cert on June 28,
2019.244 After oral arguments in January 2020, the Supreme Court
should issue its opinion in this case by summer 2020.
B. Public Policy Does Not Necessarily Require International Arbitral
Award to be Vacated by a United States Court.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

243. Id.
244. GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp., fka Converteam SAS, v.
Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al., No. 18-1048 (U.S.S.C.).
245. 941 F.3d 487 (11th Cir. 2019).
246. Codified under United States law at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.
247. 941 F.3d at 490-91.
248. Id. at 503-04.
249. Id. at 490-91.
250. Id. at 490.
251. Id. at 490-91.
252. Id. at 491.
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In Cvoro v. Carnival Corp.,245 the Eleventh Circuit had to decide
whether, under Article V of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention" or
the "Convention"),246 a Serbian plaintiff's arbitral award rendered in
Monaco under Panamanian substantive law, must be vacated as
against United States public policy. 247 In a decision the outcome of
which depended more on the parties' choice of law than arbitration
principles, the Eleventh Circuit held in a case of first impression that
the arbitral decision under Panamanian law did not violate United
States public policy despite the plaintiff being unable to recover a
statutory remedy under United States law under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 30104.248
In Cvoro, the plaintiff, Ms. Cvoro, was a citizen and resident of
Serbia who was employed on the cruise ship "Carnival Dream" as a
waitress.249 Carnival was a Panamanian corporation with its principal
place of business in Miami, Florida.250 Cvoro and Carnival agreed in an
employment agreement that Cvoro and Carnival would resolve all legal
disputes in arbitration in one of several locales closest to her home, with
the law governing the disputes to be the law of the flag of the ship,
Panama.251 Cvoro developed carpal tunnel syndrome in her hand and
became disabled and unable to work.252 Carnival, to comply with its
maintenance and cure obligations under maritime law, selected shore-
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253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 491-92.
256. Id. at 491.
257. Id. at 491-92. Cvoro later dropped the maintenance and cure claim because
Carnival had in fact paid for all of Cvoro's medical bills and room and board. Id. at 492.
258. Id. at 492.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 492-93.
262. Id. at 493. Cvoro also sought to litigate the merits of her claims under the Jones
Act, among other things. Id.
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side physicians in Serbia to continue treating Cvoro.253 Ultimately,
Cvoro had hand surgery by the Serbian doctors chosen by Carnival, but
according to Cvoro, the surgery was negligent and she developed
"horrific symptoms due to the negligence of the Serbian doctors" from
which she never recovered.254
Cvoro filed an arbitration proceeding against Carnival in Monaco to
recover from her injuries, asserting two causes of action under United
States law.255 Cvoro brought a claim under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 30104, asserting that Carnival was vicariously liable for the
negligence of the shore-side doctors in Serbia that Carnival selected to
treat her injuries.256 Cvoro also asserted a claim for maintenance and
cure under maritime law for medical treatment and room and board.257
The arbitrator decided that Panamanian law governed the claims
because of the choice of law provision in the arbitration agreement
which provided the law of the Carnival Dream's flag would govern. 258
The arbitrator rejected Cvoro's arguments that United States law
should apply notwithstanding the choice of law agreement because
there was not a sufficiently close connection between the dispute and
the United States, the only relevance of the United States being that it
was Carnival's principal place of business. 259 Nevertheless, Cvoro
continued to argue for United States law, specifically the Jones Act, to
apply, and she conceded that she was not asserting any claims under
Panamanian law, which she further conceded would not recognize any
claim for vicarious liability like the Jones Act does.260 The arbitrator
analyzed Cvoro's claims under Panamanian law and dismissed them
because Cvoro had not established Carnival's liability under the law of
Panama.261
Cvoro sued in the Southern District of Florida seeking to vacate the
arbitration award or obtain an order denying its enforceability. 262
Meanwhile, Carnival filed an action in Monaco to confirm the
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263. Id. at 494.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 495, citing Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH,
141 F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998), 9 U.S.C. § 207, and New York Convention, art. III.
266. Id., quoting New York Convention, art. V(2)(b).
267. 941 F.3d at 496, quoting Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v.
Del Monte Int'l GmbH, 921 F.3d 1291, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998).
268. Id. at 496, citing 46 U.S.C. § 30104 and Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383 U.S. 262, 264
(1966).
269. Id. at 496.
270. Id.
271. 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998).
272. 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011).
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arbitration award.263 The United States district court refused to vacate
the arbitration award and the Monaco court confirmed the arbitration
award.264 Cvoro appealed the district court ruling, arguing that
enforcement of the arbitration award would be contrary to the public
policy of the United States, as provided as one of the seven defenses to
enforceability of an international arbitration award under the New
York Convention.265 The "public policy defense" under Article V(2)(b) of
the New York Convention states that enforcement of an arbitral award
"may be refused if the competent authority in the country where . . .
enforcement is sought finds that . . . recognition or enforcement of the
award would be contrary to the public policy of that country." 266 The
Court found that the public policy defense only applies "when
confirmation or enforcement of a foreign arbitration award would
violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice." 267
Cvoro argued on appeal that the award should not be enforced
because it was contrary to the United States' explicit public policy with
respect to the protection of seamen as codified in the Jones Act which
allows a cause of action for seamen against their employer for vicarious
liability for injuries sustained by the negligence of their agents.268
Essentially, Cvoro's position on appeal was that because the arbitration
award deprived her of a remedy available under United States la that is
not available under Panamanian law, enforcement of the arbitral award
would be contrary to the public policy of the United States. 269 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the specific issue had never been addressed
in this Circuit, but recognized that two Eleventh Circuit opinions
provide guidance270 – Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,271 and
Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd. 272
In Lipcon, the Court refused to invalidate a choice of law provision
simply because the remedies available in the contractually chosen
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forum are less favorable that in the United States. 273 Instead, a choice
of law clause will be declared unenforceable only when the remedies "in
the chosen forum are so inadequate that enforcement would be
fundamentally unfair."274 In Lindo, the plaintiff, like Cvoro, argued that
he would lose Jones Act remedies under United States law if his chosen
law, Bahamas law applied in an arbitration proceeding located in
Nicaragua, applied to his claims.275 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
holding that Lindo had failed to show that application of Bahamian law
remedies would be "fundamentally unfair" as compared to what would
be available under the Jones Act under United States law. 276 In both
Lipcon and Lindo, the Eleventh Circuit compared the remedies
available under the contractually-chosen applicable law to U.S. law and
found that enforcement of the choice of law would not be
"fundamentally unfair."277
Following its reasoning in Lipcon and Lindo, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the remedies available to Cvoro under Panamanian law were
not "so inadequate that enforcement would be fundamentally unfair." 278
Announcing the test for future cases involving enforcement of arbitral
awards (as opposed to cases seeking to compel arbitration), the Court
stated that "whether a court should refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral
award based on public policy is not whether the claimant was provided
with all of her statutory rights under U.S. law during arbitration . . .
[r]ather, the public-policy defense 'applies only when confirmation or
enforcement of a foreign arbitration award would violate the forum
state's most basic notions of morality and justice.'"279 Because Cvoro
had not made such a showing, the Court refused to vacate the district
court and vacate the arbitral award.280

The 2018-2019 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions,
many of which concerned issues of first impression in the Eleventh
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273. 941 F.3d at 497, discussing Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1297.
274. Id., quoting Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1297.
275. Id. at 498, discussing Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1280-85.
276. Id., discussing Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1284-85. As a procedural matter, it is important
to note that Cvoro and Lindo were in post-arbitration and pre-arbitration postures,
respectively. In Cvoro, the plaintiff was seeking to vacate or prevent enforcement of the
arbitration award. In Lindo, the plaintiff was
277. Id. at 503.
278. Id. at 503-04.
279. Id., quoting Inversiones y Procesadora, 921 F.3d at 1306 (other cites omitted).
280. 941 F.3d at 504.
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VI. CONCLUSION
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Circuit. While this survey is not intended to be exhaustive, the Authors
have attempted to provide material that will be useful to practitioners
by providing relevant updates in the area of federal trial practice and
procedure in the Eleventh Circuit.
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